The Peninsula - Latest Comments

Re: Use Caution When Working on Korean Unification with China

jaw111 — Wed, 22 May 2013 01:32:00 -0000

China holds the trump card in unification, everyone knows that.

Re: Has North Korean Rhetoric Changed Under Kim Jong-un?

Ioannis — Tue, 07 May 2013 10:24:05 -0000

Very interesting POV!

However, allow me to draw another conclusion and namely that Kim Jong Un is attempting to readjust his position in fear of showing himself too open. For the first time in decades, we are shown many photos from Pyongyang, Rodman gets to watch a basketball game, Google's Schmidt is paying visits to NK officials, there is a 3G network for foreigners only e.t.c,

In order to compensate for his openness, Kim Kong Un uses at the same time more inflammatory rhetoric. In an attempt to assert himself as the new leader of NK, he is stretching towards friendlier gestures and the use of more aggressive terms.

Welcome to the New North Korea!

Re: The Asymmetrical Challenges of North Korea’s Air Force

Rust Flying Circus — Thu, 28 Mar 2013 20:39:11 -0000

It is a myth that Matias Rust flew undetected. He was detected from the start but bureocratic rules of engagement prevented Soviet Air Force to take him down.

Re: Rodman Doesn’t Understand the Big Picture with North Korea, and He May Have Hurt It

Confucius Confucius — Sat, 16 Mar 2013 20:24:27 -0000

I disagree. I suggest separating Kim Jong Un from the North Korean regime. Was Rodman able to have a private moment with Kim Jong Un out of hearing range of the North Korean interpreter? If that was the circumstance under which the two profound statements were made "Tell Obama call me" and "I don't want war", then there is opportunity to go straight to the top instead of dealing with UN reps or low level bureaucrats. If those messages were delivered through the North Korean interpreter then I would still pursue dialogue, but maybe let Michael Jordan make the call as we should not lose this chance to get inside Kim Jong Un's head. Jordan is averse to going to Pyongyang, but might be honored to make the call using a White House phone. We are losing too much intel by dismissing Dennis.

Re: The Asymmetrical Challenges of North Korea’s Air Force

Stuart Collins — Wed, 13 Mar 2013 05:27:18 -0000

Do you think they'd be able to launch a surprise attack? I'm guessing the south would see the planes coming and scramble interceptors.

Re: North Korea Allows Internet Access (For Foreigners)

Jackson — Sat, 02 Mar 2013 20:33:30 -0000

That is good , i can see change in DPRK.

i hope that north korean citizens who are victims of Kim Jung Un
will have the ability to access internet.

Re: Mobile Computing Wars: Samsung vs. Apple

Ha ha here you go again : ) — Tue, 29 Jan 2013 13:33:43 -0000

A typical type of deligent-looking Niponjing who gladly surfs on internet, looking for topics to criticize about, and all they say is about despising other companies or products, right?

It looks rather qute to find out these child-like comments. The approximate age I can even guess right now, and appearance I can already visualize by reading at the quality of content people jot here.

Please do not deteriorate the Image of Japan, the country of courtesy.

Waka taka? Kozo!

Re: Women Leading Korea

Rand Noel — Wed, 19 Dec 2012 18:05:56 -0000

And Now Park Geun-hye is elected the First Female President of the Modern Era

Re: The Asymmetrical Challenges of North Korea’s Air Force

case24570 — Fri, 14 Dec 2012 00:13:05 -0000

The only chance the Norks would have of establishing even limited air superiority would be a surprise mass-attack against South Korean airfields. If you can catch your adversary on the ground it doesn't matter how much better his aircraft is. In the event the balloon went up I'd expect a mass attack involving Mig-17's, Mig-19's, Il-28's, A-5's, and perhaps transoprts rigged with makeshift bomb racks, against South Korean airfields. The aim would be to destroy as many aircraft on the ground as possible as well as making runways unusable. I'd expect this to take place along with a massive SCUD attack. The Nork's would keep their more capable air assets (Mig 21, 23, 29) in reserve to defend against the South's counter-attack. Of course this entire strategy hinges on the North's ability to launch the majority of their aircraft very quickly....a task which I doubt they have the required skill to do.

Re: Is North Korea Communist?

James — Sun, 02 Dec 2012 23:30:48 -0000

Howard is 100% right. They are not communist.

Re: Could Israel’s Iron Dome Protect South Korea?

Roger Cavazos 金大健 — Wed, 21 Nov 2012 13:52:52 -0000

This is a great way to move the debate forward and consider different aspects from proliferation to strategic depth.

This response expands on the common ground of Iron Dome being useful in South Korea to a certain extent. I think Iron Dome or something like it is very helpful to South Korea, but with consequences we can't fully foresee right now.

Here's the likely bottom line - as soon as DPRK fires a ballistic missile into Seoul or South Korea, North Korea has begun the process of having their regime systematically dismantled. A North Korean ballistic missile attack is a-strategic (there's no strategy other than terror). And if the missile has a chemical or biological warhead - set up a war crimes tribunal, because there will likely be some North Koreans with one way tickets to The Hague. It could happen, but if the regime wants nothing more than to stay in power, a missile is a phenomenally risky gamble with odds even worse than Russian roulette. DPRK may be wily, but they've rarely been crazy.

And even if North Korea were to launch every one of their 1,000 or so missiles, then they have no more leverage to threaten anyone else with their missiles. More later in the response.

Given that FAJR3 240 MM has the same range (~45KM), caliber (240MM) and payload weight (45KG) as some DPRK systems and there are likely 200 systems that can range the northern exurbs of Seoul-Incheon conurbation and that they can fire about 3,400 rounds in an opening salvo here are some rough order of magnitude calculations what Iron Dome could do.
Many more details here - especially around pages 33-36.
http://nautilus.wpengine.netdn...

If we assume there are roughly 100 each of the M1985 (24 rockets) and M1991 (12 rockets) variants, that means a total of 3,400 rounds possible in an opening salvo and then a 15 minute pause to re-load.
North Korea only has to fire one salvo to send folks in the heart of Seoul scrambling into any one of the shelters available. Seoul subway alone has space for 20 million.

Assuming the pK (probability of kill) is at the lower end of .8. It's pretty straightforward calculation that 4,250 Iron Dome rockets would buy Seoul about 15 minutes' warning time and may save about 2,000 lives in the event of an artillery barrage. As soon as rounds fly, people in Seoul-Incheon will start to fill the shelters with capacity of 20 million people.

Given 60 missiles per battery, that means South Korea would need about 75 (70.8) batteries. This aint cheap. Each battery is about $50 million and each missile around $100,000. The combined cost of roughly $4.2 billion (3.75 billion for batteries and .425 billion for missiles) would eat up about 14% of Korea's ENTIRE defense budget. But this isn't all or nothing; there's likely some happy medium which is up to the Koreans to decide.

Now about the missiles... North Korea probably has around 1,000 missiles that can range Seoul or further. Let's assume the pK against a ballistic missile drops to around .5 from .8 since we don't know the real answer - and neither does North Korea, then 2,000 Iron Dome missiles would make North Korea's missile program irrelevant for threatening South Korea. However, there are likely unknown changes to the status quo and state of deterrence on the peninsula.

Will a mostly irrelevant missile program lead North Korea to pour more money into new and more missiles, or will North Korea pour more money into their economy to peacefully assimilate at some future date or will North Korea pour more money into Unconventional Warfare such as Special Forces or cyber?

As an aside, I'm a little surprised that the FAJR systems are not being systematically destroyed by the Israeli air force. Given the limited space to surveil, Israel could likely destroy each of the pieces almost immediately after thany FAJR fires. Sounds like a political consideration rather than a military issue.

@NTI @CNS has some very good material also at
http://www.nti.org/country-pro...

You're right to point out that Iron Dome is not THE answer to South Korea's problems, but capabilities like Iron Dome by any other name can help save a large number of lives directly and by indirectly by providing warning time.

Re: Why Are Fewer Women Defecting From North Korea?

NKwatcher — Wed, 21 Nov 2012 11:17:56 -0000

FYI - "Africa" is not a country.

Re: Could Israel’s Iron Dome Protect South Korea?

Joey — Wed, 21 Nov 2012 09:57:49 -0000

More likely that they would wait until Skyguard has been fully developed, which is a lot cheaper ($1000 per shot) and effective against the kind of armaments the DPRK possesses. But wasn't South Korea already interested in Iron Dome back in 2011?

Re: Is North Korea Communist?

Howard Brad — Wed, 14 Nov 2012 14:20:12 -0000

Of course the DPRK isn't "communist." They stopped referring to rhemselves that way a generation ago. Have you even been to the DPRK?

Re: Does Korea Have a Branding Problem?

Albert Einstein — Thu, 25 Oct 2012 21:12:59 -0000

Nationalism is an infantile disease. It is the measles of mankind.
Albert Einstein

Re: South Korea’s Strategic Investment Deals in the Middle East

QuestionMark — Tue, 16 Oct 2012 16:38:46 -0000

Just a simple question. A big chunk of FDI and the biggest commercial activities from/of South Korea in the countries with higher political risks (which is NOT as it is with any investment), which one would you call the winner, South Korea or those countries in the Middle East?

Re: Sushi Wars

Emi Ireland — Fri, 28 Sep 2012 15:06:29 -0000

Fascinating article; well researched. I agree that non-binding agreements cannot adequately address these growing problems. We are increasingly becoming one global system economically and ecologically, yet our policies and administrative apparatus are slow to adapt to this change. Europe's handling of its financial crisis is an example.

Re: Apologies in Northeast Asia – A Discussion with Dr. Jennifer Lind

Susan Menadue-Chun — Thu, 30 Aug 2012 21:37:21 -0000

This line of argument makes so much sense. Brilliant! Thank you for your helpful insight.

Re: Apologies in Northeast Asia – A Discussion with Dr. Jennifer Lind

Leonid Petrov — Thu, 30 Aug 2012 13:11:38 -0000

Excellent interview!

Re: The Challenges of Forming Deeper Ties with India for Both Koreas

Raj — Wed, 22 Aug 2012 22:31:12 -0000

Unfortunately mandarins at South Block are least concerned about reputation and interest of the country. They are more concerned about promoting their cronies. That is why quite a number of people with unstable brains are also found to be representing the country as if it is their birth right to be envoys. A large proportion of officers get plum postings and promotions by sheer maskabaji. This seems to be the first time that anyone from the entire IFS (B) has been appointed as an Ambassador because other promotee officers appointed as Ambassadors are appointed years after they are actually inducted into Indian Foreign Service branch A, that too with great difficulty. May almighty inculcate a sense of duty in the leadership and upper echelons of officialdom so that decisions are taken in national interest.

Re: Korea Adjusts Policies as the Economy Hangs in the Balance

Madssullung — Wed, 22 Aug 2012 14:56:39 -0000

I believe shipbuilding sector's recent struggle has more to do with industry-specific factors such as oversupply of ships ordered by shippers amidst decreasing shipping activity, which was mainly caused by global economic slowdown and consequent lower global demand for goods. it's been quite some time since certain shipbuilders located both in & outside of Korea have seen some order cancelations by shippers. This in turn increased the chance of shipbuilders defaulting on their loans and I believe European lenders are showing reluctance to lend more so to this industry vs others as they are fully aware of this situation. Even if shipbuilders look to other regional lenders, I believe more astute ones will probably pass or charge them materially higher rate.

Re: Upgrading South Korea’s Air Force

Maryjanerooney — Mon, 30 Jul 2012 07:35:49 -0000

A serious in depth piece of analysis the kind we have come to expect

Re: Driving Change in the DPRK

Nathan Lee — Mon, 23 Jul 2012 11:40:52 -0000

newageman,

I agree with you that the drastic hard-line policies adopted during the Bush administration following 9/11 did undermine much of the progress that was made under the Clinton administration. But to look solely at the failure of the Agreed Framework and blame the U.S. for the energy shortage in the DPRK overlooks the broader point that the DPRK regime has actively chosen to allocate its meager resources in ineffective ways. One example that comes to mind is the construction of the April 25 Hotel (which can accommodate 20,000 guests) at a time when famines had killed an estimated 1 million people (http://goo.gl/NFvNt). The construction of such a grand facility during a period of dire circumstances not only seems to undermine your argument that North Korea is constantly “forced” to spend on its national defense, but also reflects that there could surely have been a wiser allocation of resources in order to save the 3-5% of the entire country’s population. Furthermore, as Scott Snyder has written (http://goo.gl/0iBUI), the DPRK institutionalized emergency humanitarian assistance as a component of its annual “budget” in order to feed its citizens while following the same failed economic policies, making no major changes to its agricultural structure or policies. The failed 2009 currency reforms which crushed market activities (http://goo.gl/n13Pc) also reflects the DPRK’s continued pursuit of failed policies, to such an extent that public outcry against the reforms spurred apologies from senior officials like Park Nam-ki and Kim Yong-il in February 2010.

But going back to the Agreed Framework – could the Bush administration have sought to build greater trust with the DPRK? Could such trust have led to a potentially effective implementation of the Agreed Framework? Perhaps. But to blame the U.S. for an energy shortage in the DPRK mistakenly also assumes the existence of a North Korean regime that would have allocated those resources wisely, when the regime has in fact repeatedly demonstrated that is instead myopically focused on elevating its military over the average citizen. I stand by my assertion that the DPRK regime bears full responsibility for the poor condition of economic and social affairs in its country.

Re: Do English-Teacher Cuts in Korea Signal a Sea Change?

Pkb — Fri, 20 Jul 2012 20:53:55 -0000

Like Alien Teachers my experience of 9 years teaching in South Korea both in the public and private sectors between 2003-2012 came nowhere near the $40.000 figure ...even when I held two jobs. W1.800.000 - W2,000,000 is closer to the mark and as far too many teachers get ripped off that figure has to be taken as coming from a good employer. Read some of the blogs on Dave's ESL if you really want to know what is going on on the ground for teachers.

Re: Driving Change in the DPRK

newageman — Fri, 20 Jul 2012 14:06:03 -0000

Nathan's claim that "North Korea’s leadership alone bears full responsibility for the disastrous state of economic and social affairs in the DPRK" is stretching the facts
too far.

It is true that the NK government is mainly responsible for its food shortage.
However, the article ignores the continuing state of war and the tense military situation on the Korean Peninsula. Because Uncle Sam is refusing to end the Korean War by
signing a peace treaty with NK, the latter is constantly forced to spend a large
portion of its government budget for national defense.

In addition, the food problem is closely
connected to the shortage in electricity, and the US shares a major blame for
the problem.

Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, Uncle Sam promised to build
two light-water nuclear reactors for electricity in return for NK's abandonment of
the two nuclear reactors it was building at the time. But, as we know, Uncle
Sam did not keep its promise, while NK stopped building its reactors. This
contributed directly to the shortage of electricity in NK.